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Abstract
Software vulnerabilities have significant costs associated with them. To aid in the prioritization of
vulnerabilities, analysts often utilize Common Vulnerability Scoring System’s Base severity
scores. However, the Base scores provided from the National Vulnerability Database are
subjective and may incorrectly convey the severity of the vulnerability in an organization's
network. This thesis proposes a method to statically analyze context-aware network graphs to
increase accuracy of CVSS severity scores. Through experimentation of the proposed
methodology, it is determined that context-aware network graphs can capture the required
metrics to generate modified severity scores. The proposed approach has some accuracy to it,
but leaves room for additional network context to further refine Environmental severity scores.
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Calculating Common Vulnerability Scoring System’s Environmental Metrics Using
Context-Aware Network Graphs
Software vulnerabilities are costly problems. For developers and project managers, they
can delay a project due date and subsequently drive up the cost of the project. Organizations
that identify library or driver vulnerabilities may require major software updates or custom
solutions to protect themselves. If they fail to identify or patch them, they can expose entire
sections of their network infrastructure to malicious actors, costing them millions of dollars and a
reduction in public trust.
To help track vulnerabilities and provide important vulnerability data for developers,
project managers and security analysts alike, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) created a centralized database called the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD). Along with vulnerability descriptions, and references to external sources, the NVD
utilizes the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to provide severity scores to enhance
risk analysis. CVSS is an open-source scoring framework used by the software industry to score
vulnerabilities, providing context to various aspects of the vulnerability. The scoring system
relies on security professionals to analyze software vulnerabilities and make recommendations
for the scores assigned to each of the vulnerability's attributes, based on the descriptions set
forth by the framework. The CVSS specification outlines an approach for organizations to add
environmental context to a particular vulnerability. For instance, an organization may realize that
a firewall prevents a particular vulnerability from accessing the network and an analyst may
update the Attack Vector score to reflect that an attacker may need to have physical access to
the machine in order to run the exploit. One of the major downsides of this extension, is the
inputs are entirely up to the analyst or team of analysts. What one analyst may conclude from
the structure of the compromised machine or network, can be different from another analyst.
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Consequently, the new generated score becomes very subjective and may miss elements or
include too many elements that affect the overall score, and the score may hold different
meaning to third party analysts.
The goal of this thesis is to provide an extension to the CVSS Environmental scoring
framework that performs static analysis of contextualized networks to generate modified severity
scores. The two questions that this body of work seeks to answer are the following:
R1. Can context-aware network graphs capture the required metrics to calculate CVSS
Environmental scores?
R2. Can the proposed technique accurately calculate CVSS Environmental scores?
This thesis first defines the models and methods used for capturing network context. The
network topology is converted into connectivity and communications graphs that depict the
physical and logical connections between machines. The graphs are used to determine how the
physical locations of vulnerabilities impact the overall network. To capture the context of
individual nodes, a security questionnaire is proposed. The security questionnaire provides a
method for security analysts to input metadata about each node. Following the description of the
framework and examples of the expected outcomes for each CVSS metric, two experiments
were conducted using a sample network and three vulnerabilities with different severity
classifications. The first experiment randomizes the location of each vulnerability in the network
while the second experiment places the vulnerabilities onto a single node and randomizes the
communications graph. The evaluation of vulnerabilities in a sample network shows that the
proposed framework is capable of capturing the required metrics to calculate new CVSS scores.
It also shows that introducing network and machine context increases accuracy, however there
is room for additional improvement to further increase accuracy.

7
This thesis is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the related literature.
The third section, Measuring CVSS Environmental Scores, describes the details of the network
graphs created from network topologies, the methods for capturing additional metadata about
network machines, and the proposed framework for calculating Environmental scores. The
fourth section, Analyzing CVSS Environmental Scores, provides the evaluation of the proposed
approach along with an analysis of the results. The fifth section lists the identified limitations of
this thesis. Future work is discussed in the sixth section, and the final section summarizes the
conclusions of this thesis.
Related Works
The lack of accuracy in CVSS is not a new problem and is a heavily researched topic.
Noting the problems present in CVSS severity scores, many works have been published
seeking new methods to improve the severity calculation. This section summarizes existing
work that is more closely related to the topic of this thesis.
Fruhwirth and Mannisto (2009) aimed to expand CVSS 2.0 severity calculation accuracy
by adding additional context to CVSS scores. They identify that CVSS Base scores, which are
used by the NVD and by extension organizations using the NVD to prioritize work on
vulnerabilities, lack the contextual data to accurately categorize the vulnerability in question.
This can cause organizations to add unneeded costs by potentially providing a critical response
to a vulnerability that should actually be categorized as low severity. Fruhwirth and Mannisto
thus proposed methods to estimate the missing data points using models created by Frei et al.
(2006), to calculate Temporal, Exploitability and Remediation Level scores. They also conducted
an interview of security managers to estimate the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of a
vulnerability. The information they gathered was then used to recalculate Base scores of various
vulnerabilities and their cost, and shown that introducing contextual data can accurately
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categorize vulnerabilities. Overall, they showed that the more accurate categorization caused a
reduction in cost. R. Wang et al. (2011) expanded on Fruhwirth et al. by proposing
improvements to the Exploitability metric by including OS Type and Server Type in the base
algorithm. Like Fruhwirth, they identified that the current Environmental and Temporal
calculations provide subjective measures that affect the categorization of the vulnerability. The
changes they proposed to these metrics improved the CVSS severity score by adding context
about the environment the vulnerability lives in and the impact to the organization. These two
papers explored methods for improving accuracy of the CVSS framework by adding contextual
data about the organization or the machine itself in order to improve accuracy and reduce cost.
However, these papers did not consider changes to the CVSS framework to include contextual
information about the entire network. This thesis aims to improve Environmental scoring by
providing methods to evaluate an organization’s network.
The introduction of contextual data, particularly network topologies, to the CVSS
framework in order to assist in security analysis has been researched before. Nemes et al.
(2019) utilized P-Graphs to analyze the network topology and generate reliability scores based
on CVE data within the network. The P-Graph is created from the services found in the network.
They found that introducing context about services in the network, they were able to estimate
the robustness of the network under scrutiny. S. Wang et al. (2015) introduces a method to rank
the types of vulnerabilities based on an analysis of the environmental factors of a network. The
method proposed uses log information from the network to analyse the impacts of a vulnerability
and rank them. The ranking algorithm was developed to improve the risk analysis process that
penetration testers use. They found that their approach was able to dynamically rank
vulnerabilities and their CWE’s based on the configuration of the network. While these works
incorporated the network topology into their methodologies, they did not improve upon the
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CVSS score calculation. Nemes et al. utilizes CVSS and P-graphs to generate robustness
scores, and S. Wang et al. utilizes network context to rank vulnerabilities for prioritization. The
proposed approach in this thesis aims to generate Environmental scores using static analysis of
the network topology and additional contextual data about the machines present to directly
improve the CVSS framework and categorization of vulnerabilities.
Due to the lack of accuracy in vulnerability prioritization and measuring real world impact
of CVE’s using CVSS base scores, several works proposed new methods that expand or
incorporate CVSS calculations. To help improve the vulnerability prioritization process,
Dobrovoljc et al. (2017) introduced a method that combines CVSS base metrics with attacker
characteristics. Their method for prioritizing vulnerabilities used CVSS scores and attacker
behavior to model the impact of vulnerabilities. They then tested multiple prioritization policies to
determine which method performed the best. They found that adding attacker behavior along
with CVSS metrics yielded better performance than CVSS on its own. L. Gallon and J. J.
Bascou (2011) proposed a method to measure the host and network impacts of a CVE by
integrating CVSS information into attack graphs. They developed CVSS attack graphs to
calculate the damages caused by an individual against the entire network as opposed to
individual nodes. They tested their approach against a sample network and found that by
introducing CVSS data from previous steps, they are able to more accurately estimate the
impact of an attack. They did note that their approach does not take into account CVSS
Temporal and Environmental scores and will need to address these in the future. These works
dealt with simulation of attackers in an environment. While simulations can be very useful, using
attacker behavior can be complex to understand due to its dynamic nature, so this thesis
proposes a static analysis tool for assessing the impacts of vulnerabilities and aims to assist in
risk analysis.
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At the time of writing, there has been no research performed in generating CVSS
Environmental scores by statically analyzing a network topology with contextual data about
individual machines and their connections. None of the research that currently exists takes a
holistic approach to improving Environmental scores by incorporating network topology. The
proposed methodology in this thesis aims to fill that gap.
Measuring CVSS Environmental Scores
The CVSS scoring system aims to provide a standardized calculation of vulnerability
severity to aid in risk analysis, while providing an open framework so users can understand
scores generated by a third party. The algorithm also allows organizations to contextualize the
vulnerability in their own network. Given that the inputs can be arbitrary, this proposed approach
aims to provide a standard way of adding context to previously scored vulnerabilities.
There are many different security systems, network configurations and actors that affect
how a vulnerability can impact a network. There are also various transmission mechanisms and
transport layers that impact the reach of a vulnerability or communication between different
machines. To reduce the scope and complexity of the research, the proposed framework is
designed to handle the network at a high level, by utilizing network graphs to represent the
topology of the network and avoiding the many implementation details of network
communication. Handling the high level concepts with simple questions such as “Is the machine
connected to the internet?” makes the overall framework simpler to understand, more practical
to employ, and can handle a broad range of network designs and configurations. However, the
framework is designed such that it can be extended to include more information about the
network and become more granular in its score generation. This leaves the door open for future
work on many different portions of the framework.
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There are a few assumptions made while developing the proposed framework. One
assumption is that the attacker can execute any attack with 100% success. Attackers have a
wide range of skills and varying degrees of knowledge about the network topology. There is a
large body of research pertaining to attacker behavior prediction and simulation. This approach
differs from other sources by removing the attacker and focusing strictly on the vulnerability and
network configurations. The framework takes a different mindset, by evaluating the influence of
network structure and providing an objective calculation to the severity of vulnerabilities in a
non-simulated environment. Because of the focus on topology of the network, incorporation of
attacker behavior simulations into the scoring framework can be left for future work. Another
assumption made is that the source of all attacks comes from outside the network. While it is a
vital portion of network security, insider threat introduces many factors external to the physical
characteristics to the network, like personnel security levels and physical access to machines
and can be left for future work.
The following sections will describe the various inputs required for the proposed
framework, and the various algorithms developed to calculate the Modified Environmental
metrics of a vulnerability. Modeling Network Topology Through Context-Aware Network Graph
defines the representation of a computer network in a form that can be consumed by the later
algorithms. Adding Additional Security Context describes the method for adding additional
metadata about machines in the network. And finally, Approximating CVSS Metrics introduces
the changes necessary to the CVSS Environmental scoring framework to incorporate the
network context into the final score.
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Modeling Network Topology Through Context Aware Network Graph
The core of this framework begins with the representation of the network. The topology
is represented as a network graph which consists of nodes representing devices, and edges
defining relationships between those devices.
There are several types of devices that can exist on the network: routers, servers,
switches, and machines. Routers are classified as devices that route traffic through the network.
These devices typically have one to many connections to other devices on the same network,
representing physical cables, or wireless connections. Routers can also provide security
protocols that dictate communications between devices that are connected to it. Switches
represent hardware that connect multiple devices to the same network. While switches can
include software to manage traffic passing through it, switches in the network graph are
responsible for simply routing packets to other machines. Servers are devices that run remote
functionality and contain business critical applications and databases, code repositories, and
important business data, to name a few things. Servers typically do not allow physical access to
their environments, allowing access only through other network connected devices. Machines
represent any other device that does not fit into the previously defined categories. Machines can
be anything from desktop computers, to network intrusion devices, to cell phones.
As mentioned previously, edges represent relationships between machines. There are
two types of edges that illustrate different relationships. connectivity edges portray physical
connections between machines, such as LAN cables, WiFi connections, and Bluetooth
connections to name a few. Within the network graph, connection edges are undirected edges
and define the basis of the network. While connection edges illustrate physical connections,
communication edges are directed edges that represent a permission between two machines. If
a machine has permission to communicate to another, an edge will exist. Communication edges
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are used to represent access control components of the network, such as firewall permissions.
These edges carry two attributes, the minimum permission needed to access the target
machine, and the difficulty to bypass authentication schemes and firewalls. The use of these
attributes will be addressed in the Modified Attack Complexity and Modified Privileges Required
sections.
Combining these node and edge types, two graph types can be created to fully
represent a computer network: the connectivity graph and the communications graph. The
connectivity graph is an undirected graph containing the nodes and connectivity edges and the
communications graph is a directed graph containing nodes and communications edges. These
different types of graphs of the same network allow for algorithms proposed to be specialized for
the type of graph under scrutiny. It also allows for cleaner views for an analyst to review.
A simple network containing three devices, a desktop computer, a laptop and a mobile
phone is depicted in Figure 1. The desktop computer is directly plugged into the wireless router
and laptop via an ethernet cable, and the laptop and mobile phone are connected to the
wireless router via a wireless connection. Using this network, the connectivity and
communications graphs shown in Figures 2 and 3 can be created.
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Figure 1
Example Basic Network

The expectant connectivity graph, depicted in Figure 2, is created from the example
network in Figure 1. Each node in the network represents each of the machines from the source
network diagram, while each of the edges represent the physical connections between each
node. An edge, for example (A, D), would be interpreted as, A is physically connected to D.
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Figure 2
Example Connectivity Graph

Note. This graph is created from the base network defined in Figure 1.
Figure 3 depicts the resultant communications graph after analyzing the logical
connections, like firewall configurations, of machines in the example network. An edge in this
directed graph can be thought of as an allowed communication from one node to another. So
the paths (A, C) and (C, A) mean that the two machines can communicate freely. Conversely,
missing direct paths between the Internet and Node D, would represent a scenario where D is
not allowed to communicate to the Internet despite having a direct connection from the
connectivity graph and vice versa.
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Figure 3
Example Permissions Graph

Note. This graph is created from the base network defined in Figure 1.
The communication edges shown have additional metadata attached to them to help
describe the nature of the connection but have been omitted for simplicity. This additional
metadata will be described in more detail later in the paper.
Adding Additional Security Context to Network Devices
When assessing the impact of a vulnerability in a network, it is important to evaluate the
security protocols of each machine. To capture the security context of each node, the security
questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire asks various questions to gauge what data is
stored, the importance of any data that’s stored, and the protocols used to protect that
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data,among others. Each question in the questionnaire can be responded to with a Yes, No or
Maybe answer and those answers translate into scores based on the impact that is being
evaluated. For this approach, the questionnaire provides the security context to calculate the
Confidentiality and Integrity impacts of a vulnerability as outlined by Table 1.
Table 1
Contents of the Security Questionnaire
ID

Question

Impact Type
Confidentiality

Integrity

1

Do you store passwords on this Machine?

X

X

2

Are the Passwords stored in Plain Text?

X

X

3

Do you store log files on this Machine?

4

Do you store user information?

X

X

5

Do you store personal data in log files?

X

X

6

Do you store financial information?

X

X

7

Is there any information stored about other
machines such as IPs or Hostnames?

X

8

Does this machine contain private keys?

X

9

Do you store sensitive business data?

X

10

Do you allow public users to modify data on the
machine?

X

X

X

A questionnaire is used to capture the context of a node due to its ease of use and its
extensibility. Answers for the questionnaire are stored on each node as metadata for use during
impact calculations. How the questionnaire will be utilized to select impact metrics will be
discussed further in the Modified Confidentiality and Modified Integrity Impact sections.
Approximating CVSS Metrics
CVSS includes three groupings of metrics: Base, Temporal and Environmental. Base
metrics for a vulnerability describes the characteristics of a vulnerability across user
environments; Temporal metrics describe the time-based characteristics of a vulnerability,
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independent of a user's environment. Finally, Environmental metrics describe the vulnerabilities
characteristics when analyzed in a specific environment. Typically, vulnerabilities are given Base
scores and the analyst is responsible for defining Temporal and Environmental metrics to further
refine the overall CVSS through Modified Base scores.
This framework only focuses on automatically calculating Environmental metrics to
provide a vulnerabilities Modified Base score. Temporal scores measure the level of
exploitability, availability of fixes, and the confidence in the vulnerability descriptions. These
metrics are not impacted by network configurations so they are not included in this proposed
framework. The following sections describe each metric used in this approach in detail, and how
the approach generates scores for each. The metric scores generated are then plugged into the
overall CVSS score calculation to get an updated severity score. Each section provides a
definition of the algorithm as well as a trivial example of a network to aid in explanation. The
provided examples are created using the base network in Figure 1. and the connectivity and
communications graphs in Figures 2 and 3.
Calculating Modified Attack Vector Via Modified Shortest Path
The Attack Vector (AV) describes which vector an attacker can execute the vulnerability
in question. The AV can be any of the following: Physical, Local, Adjacent Network, and
Network. An AV of Physical constitutes an attacker being able to execute a vulnerability only
when he has direct access to the component that is vulnerable. An example of this would be
executing a cold boot attack to gain access to encryption keys. When a vulnerability has an AV
of Local, the vulnerability can only be exploited locally via a component that has access to
vulnerable software. This could be something similar to exploiting a vulnerability in a Python
SQL driver to gain root access to the corresponding database. Vulnerabilities that have an AV of
Adjacent Network means that the vulnerability can be exploited on the network where it exists.
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However, the component can only be accessed via the physical network it exists on. Finally, a
Network AV is assigned when a CVE can be exploited from outside of the network it resides on.
To determine the Modified Attack Vector (MAV) of a CVE, the connectivity graph must be
analyzed to identify a path between the infected node and the Internet. There are several rules
that were created to determine the value that the MAV can take. The first rule for the scoring
attack vector is vulnerabilities will never increase their initial attack vector. For example, a CVSS
assigned with Local will not assume Adjacent Network or Network. The assumption is made that
when the Base AV is assigned, the chosen vector is the absolute worst vector. The algorithm
does not take into account the intricacies of the vulnerability in question and as such can not
determine if it is possible for the exploit to increase its vector. Along with this rule, CVE’s that
have an attack vector of Physical will keep their respective vector. CVSS defines a Physical AV
as not bound to the network stack and requiring the attacker to exploit the vulnerability via
physical touch. The MAV can safely be assigned the initial vector of Physical because the
original score already considers that the attacker needs to physically be present to execute the
vulnerability.
CVE’s that have an AV of Network need to pass through a check to see if they are still
accessible from outside of the network. From the affected node, all paths to the internet must be
found. If there are valid paths, the paths must then be analyzed for permissions and firewall
access. If a node is physically connected to the internet and there is nothing preventing traffic to
that node, then the MAV remains Network. Figure 4. depicts an example graph where the
CVSS’ Modified Attack Vector remains Network. Node D represents a Node that contains a
vulnerability with a Base AV of Network. A path can be drawn from the Internet Node to Node D,
either through Node A or Node C, thus assigning an MAV of Network.
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Figure 4
Example of Expected Network Modified Attack Vector

Note. The vulnerability on Node D would be assigned an MAV of Network due to a direct
connection to an Internet node.
If there are no paths to the internet, or permissions blocking traffic, then the AV gets
downgraded to Adjacent Network. From here, a valid path to an adjacent node must be made.
Figure 5. represents a network that is not connected to the Internet. Since there is no valid path
between the Internet and infected Node D, then a check is made to see if Node D has any
connected neighbors. Since Node D has two neighbors, Node A and Node C, then the MAV of
Adjacent Network can be assigned.
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Figure 5
Example of Expected Adjacent Network Modified Attack Vector

Note. The vulnerability on Node D would be assigned an MAV of Adjacent Network due to a no
direct connection to an Internet node but connections to neighbors.
Finally, if the affected node does not have a path to an Internet Node and it does not
have any neighbors, then the MAV is assigned Local. Figure 6. depicts an example of Node D
being assigned a Local MAV.
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Figure 6
Example of Expected Local Modified Attack Vector

Note. The vulnerability on Node D would be assigned an MAV of Local due to no connections to
any nodes
After considering these possibilities, Algorithm 1 was finalized for calculating Modified
Attack Vector.
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Measuring Modified Attack Complexity Via Modified Depth-First Search
The CVSS specification defines the Attack Complexity (AC) as a metric that describes
the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Expanding the modified metric to incorporate the network, Modified Attack Complexity (MAC)
can more specifically relate to the difficulty of bypassing firewalls and bypassing authentication
methods to execute a vulnerability. According to the CVSS specification, AC can take two
values: Low and High. A Low AC means that the exploit can be easily executed and the attacker
can expect repeated success when attempting to execute multiple times. If the AC is assigned
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Low, the overall CVSS score increases. To calculate the AC value, the algorithm needs to show
there is an attack path from the affected node to the Internet that provides the smallest amount
of complexity for the attacker. If that path does not exist then the attacker may need to perform
additional steps to perform the exploit. Complexity is assigned to connectivity edges based on
the analysis of the perceived difficulty of accessing a node by analysts. For example, an edge
would be assigned a High complexity value if the analyst determines that there are several
security measures put in place that would cause some significant work to be bypassed, like
multi-factor authentication, or encrypted traffic, etc.
An example connectivity graph with complexity annotations on each edge is shown in
Figure 7. This example would produce an MAC of Low due to a valid path of Low complexity
that can be drawn between the Internet and the affected node, D. This path is represented by
the arrows in the graph and the path would read: Internet -> A -> C -> D.
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Figure 7
Example of Expected Low Attack Complexity

Note. The vulnerability on Node D would be assigned a MAC of Low due to a direct path with
Low complexity from an Internet node, denoted by the arrows.
To show an example of an MAC of Low, the connection between Node C and Node D
can be removed. Figure 8 is an example of this removal, showing that a valid path of Low
Complexity can not be drawn, and thus the only path of Internet -> A -> D, would result in High
MAC.
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Figure 8
Example of Expected High Modified Attack Complexity

Note. The vulnerability on Node D would be assigned a MAC of High due to no paths only Low
complexity
To calculate the MAC of the existing CVE, a modified depth-first search algorithm was
used. The depth-first algorithm was modified to search for a valid path between the affected
node and the Internet using only Low complexity edges. As shown in Algorithm 2, the
modification made to the algorithm lies in the condition to add the neighbor node to the search
list. In order for the algorithm to progress further, the edge complexity of the current node’s
neighbors must be equal to the value Low. In the event a neighbor with an edge complexity of
Low is found, then the neighbor gets added to the set of nodes to traverse in the following
iteration. If the edge complexity of a neighbor is not Low, assuming a value of High, then the

27
neighbor is rejected as the purpose of the calculation is to find the shortest path with a Low
complexity. If a neighbor is found that has a Low complexity edge, and the neighbor is an
Internet node type, then Low is accepted as the MAC. If the algorithm can not find a path with
Low complexity, then High is accepted instead.

Calculating Modified Privileges Required Via Modified Depth-First Search
The CVSS framework provides a Privileges Required (PR) metric to capture the level of
privileges needed before executing the vulnerability. To incorporate the Modified Privileges
Required (MPR) metric into the proposed approach, the MPR algorithm requires an evaluation
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of the cumulative privileges required for each path from the afflicted node to the Internet. To fit
into the CVSS calculation, the proposed algorithm needs to identify if the privileges are either
Low, Medium, or High.
The MPR algorithm needs to quantify the amount of privileges needed to not only exploit
the vulnerability, but the privileges needed to reach the affected node. Assigning the individual
privileges, Low, Medium or High, to each connection between the nodes, the framework can
utilize a path searching algorithm to find a path from the Internet to the target node, representing
the malicious actor’s movement. The pathing algorithm should attempt to find a path of least
privilege and if it can not, should re-run the search including paths with an increased privilege.
An example of an expected MPR of None is depicted in Figure 9. If C is the afflicted Node, then
MPR is Low if the attacker is able to communicate to C with little to no privileges; Internet -> A
-> C, in this case. If the privileges along this path were updated so that the attacker could not
take this path, then a new path needs to be found.
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Figure 9
Example of Expected None Modified Privilege Required

Note. The vulnerability on Node C would be assigned a MAV of None due to a direct path with
No privileges needed existing from an Internet node. This path is denoted by the arrows.
In Figure 10, the privileges between A and C are upgraded to High, perhaps due to a
network administrator restricting login permissions between Nodes A and C. Since there are
now no paths to the affected node with Low permissions, the algorithm should find a path with
Low or Medium privileges. In the example, a path could be drawn from C -> D -> A -> Internet
using a mix of only Low and Medium privileges resulting in a Medium MPR.
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Figure 10
Example of Expected Low Modified Privilege Required

Note. The vulnerability on Node C would be assigned a MAV of Low because there is at least
one path from the Internet that does not require High privileges shown by the arrows.
If no path can be found where the malicious actor can reach the affected node with Low
or Medium privileges, then the algorithm should set the MPR to High, reflecting that the attacker
needs administrator privileges to execute the vulnerability. Figure 11. Shows an example of High
MPR, given that the path from the Internet Node to Node A is updated to require High privileges
to traverse.
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Figure 11
Example of Expected High Modified Privilege Required

Note. The vulnerability on Node C would be assigned a MAV of High because there are no
paths from the Internet that do not require High privileges shown by the arrows.
Several algorithms were investigated to accomplish the expectations of the proposed
approach. Djikstra’s Shortest path was looked at first. Weights could be assigned to each
privilege type, 1 for Low, 2 for Medium, and 3 for High. The problem with using Dijkstra’s
Shortest Path algorithm to find the shortest weighted path from the Internet to the affected node
is that it is possible for the shortest weighted path to not be the path with least privilege. It’s
possible that a much longer path with a higher accumulated weight could exist. To account for
this, the final algorithm should test all paths.The resultant algorithms are shown below.
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Algorithm 3 shows the top level algorithm for determining the MPR, while Algorithms 4 and 5
describe the searching algorithm for determining No and No and Low paths to the Internet.
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Calculating Modified Confidentiality Impact and Modified Integrity Using Eigenvector
Centrality
CVSS introduces a Confidentiality Impact (CI) and Integrity Impact (II) to measure the
impacts of the vulnerability after it has been successfully exploited. Confidentiality and Integrity
impact scores describe the impact of the vulnerability in question based on the importance of
the data on the machine to the organizations.
To accurately measure the impacts, the proposed algorithm should consider the
importance of the node relative to the rest of the network. Since network security components
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can influence the extent at which a malicious actor can access systems with important
information, the calculation should use the Communications graph. The algorithm needs to
show that network vulnerabilities that originate on machines with high importance, have a high
impact score. If the vulnerability does not exist on a machine with high importance, then the
impact score should reflect its closeness to important machines. The decision to score impact
based on the closeness of important machines was made to represent the ability of an attacker
to compromise the affected machine, and utilize that node as an entry point into the
organization’s network. To measure these two scenarios, the Eigenvector Centrality algorithm
can be used to measure the importance of nodes relative to their neighbors. This centrality
algorithm can determine the impact of an actor compromising the infected node and jumping to
neighbor nodes to access important data.
In order for Eigenvector Centrality to be calculated, each node has to be assigned a
weight. The security questionnaire previously defined can be used to generate Confidentiality
and Integrity weights for each node. This is done by first calculating the sum of questions for
each metric, and assigning them to each inbound edge as a weighted value. After calculating
Eigenvector Centrality for both confidentiality and integrity, the values are normalized to be
between zero and one. To convert the Eigenvector scores into one of None, Low and High
impacts, provided by the CVSS specification, each metric is assigned equal slices between zero
and 0:
●

scores between zero and one-third inclusive are assigned None;

●

scores between one-third exclusive and two-thirds inclusive are assigned Low;

●

scores between two-thirds inclusive and one are assigned High;
The full algorithms for both MCI and MII are shown in Algorithms 6 and 7, respectively.
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Calculating Modified Availability Impact
It is important that machines in a network are highly available in order for users to
access services and data that are stored in the network. The CVSS framework quantifies the
impact of the vulnerability in the context of the resource that the vulnerability exists in. The
Availability Impact (AI) is defined by the CVSS specification as the impact of the vulnerability on
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the component’s network bandwidth, processor cycles or disk space. In order to determine
Modified Availability (MAI) impact, the proposed approach needs to expand the CVSS definition
of AI to include the impact on the resources that exist in the entire network, not just the
availability of the impacted node.
The calculation should start by showing that there is a High impact if the vulnerability can
make large portions of the network unavailable. An example of High MAI by a vulnerability in
the example network, is shown in Figure 12. In this scenario, removal of the affected Node, A,
would result in the entire network going down. No node would be able to connect to the Internet
until Node A is back online.
Figure 12
Example of Expected High Availability Impact

Note. The expected MAI in this example would be High due to the fact that removing the edges
connected to Node A, would cause Nodes B, C, and D to be disconnected from the Internet.
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To show a vulnerability has a Low impact, the approach must show that some of the
network is no longer connected to the Internet, but not all of the machines are affected. To
demonstrate a Low MAI, the vulnerability can be moved to Node D, and an additional machine
can be added, Node E. To contextualize this change, Node E can be seen as a Virtual Machine
that exists on Node D. In this configuration, removal of the infected node results in 2 machines
no longer connected to the Internet resulting in an expected Low impact.
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Figure 13
Example of Expected Low Availability Impact

Note. The expected MAI in this example would be Low due to the fact that removing the edges
connected to Node D, would cause only Node D and E to be disconnected from the Internet.
Nodes A, B and C are still connected.
Finally, the approach should determine a None MAI the affected node is impacted or if
only a small portion of the network is affected by the removal of the impacted node. An example
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of a vulnerability with a None impact is shown in Figure 14. In this case, the expected MAI is
None due to the fact that removing Node B from the network only affects itself.
Figure 14
Example of Expected None Availability Impact

Note. This example would yield a MAI of None due to the fact that removing the edges
connected to Node B would not disconnect any other Node from the Internet.
There were several considerations when determining the best algorithm to cover the
above outcomes. The first attempt was to utilize the Betweenness Centrality algorithm to
calculate the importance of the node in a network. Betweenness provides a measure for the
number of shortest paths that pass through the target node. The problem with measuring
availability given the shortest paths passing through a machine in a network is that computer
networking does not care about shortest path communications between nodes. So long as there

41
exists a path between two machines, they will be connected. Betweenness will work if the
infected node is a bridge node, a node that has the only connection between two sections of the
network, such as a router or switch. However, If a node is removed, there could be an alternate
longer path to the Internet. It is entirely possible for a path to exist to the target node if the
infected node is out of commission, thus not impacting the overall availability of the nodes in the
network. Taking the above into consideration, Algorithm 8 was chosen to determine the MAI of a
vulnerability. Firstly, a count of all the nodes in the connectivity graph is taken. The node in
question is then removed from the graph and a count of remaining nodes is collected. The
remaining nodes are all nodes that still have a path to the Internet. Finally, a percentage of
remaining nodes is calculated and the MAI value determined. If more than two thirds of the
nodes are still connected, then the vulnerability has an MAI of None. If more than one third of
nodes are still connected, then the vulnerability has some impact, requiring the MAI to be Low. If
there are less than one third of nodes remaining, then the vulnerability has a catastrophic
impact on availability and must be assigned a High MAI.
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Exclusion of Modified User Interaction and Scope Metrics
The CVSS framework provides two additional inputs for the security expert to consider:
User Interaction (UI) and Scope (S).UI captures whether or not some user needs to perform an
action in order to successfully trigger the vulnerability. An example of UI being required, given by
the CVSS Specification, would be the requirement of a user to run an installer.Scope change
occurs when an attacker can access resources outside the control sphere of the application. An
example of this would be breaking out of a Tomcat container and modifying files the container
normally does not have access to. The proposed approach focuses solely on severity metrics
that are impacted by the network configuration and as such, does not explore how the
vulnerability is exploited, or whether or not the machine configuration can impact the change in
Scope. The base scores of the vulnerability are not modified.
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Analyzing CVSS Environmental Scores of an Example Network
To validate the approach, two experiments were devised. The goal of these experiments
is to show that introducing context about a network would have a meaningful impact on the
severity of a given vulnerability. The next section1 introduces the sample network that will be the
subject of experimentation. The following section describes the vulnerabilities selected for
experimentation and the rationale behind their selection. How the questionnaires were filled out
for each of the nodes in the network is then described. The Experimentation section sets up the
two experiments conducted and the rationale for their selection. The tool developed for
executing the experiments and gathering their results as well as the inputs to the tool are
introduced in the Tooling section. The final section analyzes the results from experimentation
and discusses how the findings answer the two research questions.
Sample Network Topology
The first step in designing the experiments is to develop the network topology. The
topology for this case study starts with the network used in the S. Wang et al. paper, shown in
Figure 15. The network used contained 8 computers and 3 routers, split into 2 subnets. The
connectivity graph created from this network is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 15
Diagram of Wang Paper Network
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Figure 16
Connectivity Graph of Wang Graph

Note. Node ids used in evaluation are displayed with parentheses
The S. Wang et al. paper lacks the information required to create the communications
graph. As a result, the graph needs to be created from scratch. To limit bias in the generation
process, the edges between all of the nodes are randomly generated using the randomization
process created for Experiment 2, described below. The final communications graph adjacency
list is recorded in Table A1.
Sample Vulnerabilities
Three CVE’s were selected for the proposed experiments. Each CVE selected
represents a different level of severity: Low severity, Medium severity, and Critical severity. A
CVE chosen from each category of severity would better demonstrate how the network
configuration can affect the various severities of the selected CVE’s. It was decided that the
CVE’s should be affecting the PostgreSQL service.
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The first CVE is CVE-2019-10209. This Low Severity CVE, when exploited, can allow a
user to read the server memory. While this vulnerability is exploitable over the network, it is
complex and requires administrative privileges to execute. The CVSS Base metrics and the
numeric score is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
CVE-2019-10209 CVSS Base Metrics

AV

AC

PR

UI

S

C

I

A

Score

Network

High

High

None

Unchanged

Low

None

None

2.2

The second CVE selected for this experiment is CVE-2019-10129. This vulnerability has
a CVSS 3.1 severity score of 6.5, and is categorized as a Medium severity vulnerability. The
vulnerability stems from the ability for an attacker to craft an insert into a partitioned table,
leading to arbitrary bytes of the server’s memory to be read. Unlike the previous CVE, this CVE
has a lower complexity and a lower required privileges contributing to the increased score. Also
contributing to the severity score, is the High Confidentiality Impact. The CVSS metrics are
broken down in Table 2.
Table 2
CVE-2019-10129 CVSS Base Metrics

AV

AC

PR

UI

S

C

I

A

Score

Network

Low

Low

None

Unchanged

High

None

None

6.5

The final CVE chosen is the Critically severe CVE-2018-16850. This CVE, when
exploited, allows the attacker to execute arbitrary SQL statements as a superuser. This CVE is

47
assigned a high CVSS base score due to it’s low complexity, low required privileges, and high
impacts to the affected component, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
CVE-2019-16850 CVSS Base Metrics

AV

AC

PR

UI

S

C

I

A

Score

Network

Low

None

None

Unchanged

High

High

High

9.8

These CVE’s were chosen for several reasons. The first reason is due to the S. Wang et
al. paper specifically mentions that they place SQL server software into their network for testing
their approach. This CVE was also chosen due to the widely used software it affects.
PostgreSQL is used in various environments, allowing the randomization of the CVE location to
seem more realistic. For example, placing a PSQL vulnerability on a network router could be
justified due to the router operating system using or allowing the installation of a PSQL server.
On the contrary, using a vulnerability that affects Microsoft Word, would not make sense if it’s
placed on the same router. A final reason is the severity score being relatively close to the
center of the scoring categories. With a CVSS score of 6.5, there is room for the score to vary
due to the network configuration. If the severity score is too low or too high, there is a greater
chance that the location of the vulnerability will not produce enough variation to validate the
approach.
Figure 17 shows the JSON structure created to capture the CVE information for use in
experimentation.
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Figure 17
JSON Input of CVE for Evaluation

Node Questionnaires
The network topology used did not include any contextual clues to create a network
diagram similar to the Wang paper. Because of this, the contextual data required for the
questionnaire needed to be arbitrarily generated.
To limit any bias from manually entering data, a randomized approach was considered.
The idea would be to select each node, and randomly select answers to the questionnaire. The
downside of this approach is the difficulty of generating random answers that seemed realistic to
the node in question. For example, the question asking “Do you store financial information?”
with an answer of Yes would make sense for a server that stores transaction data, but would not
make sense for a router in a subnet. Using answers like this could generate data that may not
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be representative of a real network. Therefore, It was decided to manually answer the
questionnaire for each node, adding variation to the responses to make them seem more
realistic. While this approach adds potential for bias, the realism outways the effect of the
potential bias. Below, Figure 18, shows an example of the resulting JSON structure for Node 10
in the network.
Figure 18
Example of Questionnaire Answers for Node 10

After answering the questionnaire for each of the nodes, the following weights were calculated
for Confidentiality and Integrity and organized in Table 4.
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Table 4
List of Confidentiality and Integrity scores
Node #

Confidentiality Weight

Integrity Weight

2

17

17

3

17

17

4

17

17

5

13

15

6

16

18

7

8

10

8

15

12

9

12

8

10

17

17

11

10

14

12

16

16

Experimentation
Using the network provided by the Wang paper, we can run analyses on various
mutations of the network to validate the approach. For this case study, an analysis will be
performed on two mutation groups: mutation on the location of the CVE, and mutation on the
communications between machines. Each mutation type is run 5 times to allow for sufficient
randomization of the CVE location or connectivity graph, respectively. The mutation of the CVE
location is performed as a simple permutation. Every run randomly selects a number between 1
and n number of nodes, and assigns the pre-defined cve to that node. Communication mutation
occurs using the Erdos-Renyi model for random graph generation.
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Mutation of CVE Location in the Network
The first set of tests focused on changing the initial location of a provided CVE to
different nodes. Performing this test focuses on the impact of a CVE on a network depending
upon the location and configuration of the node it resides on. The expectation of this test is that
CVE’s farther away from the Internet, with less important data will result in a downgrading of the
overall severity, while CVE’s closer to the internet, with more important data will result in an
upgrade in severity.
Mutation of Network Communications
The second set of tests focused on randomizing the communications between nodes.
These tests keep the CVE on a single node, and do not change the physical connections
between nodes. This test focuses on how adjusting the logical connections between nodes
affects the overall score. The expectation is that the more barriers in place that lengthens the
logical distance to the Internet, the lower the updated CVSS score will become. Changing the
communications between nodes simulates changing firewall permissions, or authentication
schemes to allow access to the adjacent node.
Tooling
To facilitate the process, the approach was implemented as a series of scripts. Python
was chosen as the programming language of choice. The scripts utilize the networkx graph
network library to generate the connectivity and communication graphs, as well as some of the
utility functions, such as the centrality functions, to calculate the updated CVSS. The scripts
parse a JSON file that describes the nodes in the network as outlined by the methodology. A
portion of the final JSON files used for experimentation is shown in Figure 19.
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Figure 19
Sample of Node Definition for Random CVE Test

Note. Data truncated for brevity
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The resulting connectivity and communication graphs are passed to the calculator, along
with the CVE data, which updates each CVSS metric. Once processing is complete, the main
script outputs each CVE’s initial score, along with each metrics base score, and outputs the
updated score generated from the calculation which is shown in Figure 20. The code for the
created tool is publically available on Github: https://github.com/cte6149/cvss-updater.
Figure 20
Sample Output of Created Tool

Findings
Experiment 1: Mutation of CVE Location in the Network
Experiment 1 was run five times, each run randomizing the location of the CVE in the
network. The set of runs for this experiment were assigned the seed, 4225731510159883032,
for repeatability. The first run places all three vulnerabilities onto Node 2 and analyzes the
changes in each modified metric, and the final modified score. The connectivity graph created
for the run along with the affected node is shown in Figure 21. The changes for each metric are
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recorded in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Bolded values are metrics that have changed compared to the
base metric.
Figure 21
Connectivity Graph of Run 1 of Experiment 1

Note. The highlighted node, Node 2, is the node selected for the first run that contains the
vulnerabilities
The results from the first run show that the vulnerabilities with lower severity scores
became more severe. The calculated modified severity score is 8.8. This is an increase from the
base severity scores for CVE-2019-10129 (2.2) and CVE-2019-10209 (6.5), and a decrease for
CVE-2019-16850 (9.8). These changes can be attributed to several factors. The first factor is
the changes in MAC, and MPR. Lower levels of required permissions and decreased complexity
of traversal between nodes caused the MAC and MPR metrics for CVE-2019-10129 to increase.
The second factor relates to the data stored on node 2. Information stored on the node causes
confidentiality and integrity impacts to increase for the mild vulnerabilities but lowered for the
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most severe vulnerability, CVE-2019-16850. This can be attributed to the node containing
various pieces of important information, such as logs, network IPs and some passwords. The
final factor for increases in the modified score relates to the availability impact from removing
the affected node from the network. The sharp increase in availability impacts for the two lower
severity vulnerabilities is expected due to the affected node being the central router of the
network and removal affects all traffic to the internet. On a positive note, the first run shows that
the modified score for CVE-2019-16850 decreased, which can be attributed to an increase in
MPR due to the node requiring some basic permissions to access.
Table 5
CVE-2019-10129 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

Low

None

Unchanged

Low

Low

High

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
Table 6
CVE-2019-10209 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

Low

None

Unchanged

Low

Low

High

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
Table 7
CVE-2019-16850 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

Low

None

Unchanged

Low

Low

High

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
The full results of all five runs are summarized in Table 8 below. The overall results of the
runs show that scores increase when placed on nodes with higher importance and less
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permissions or complexity, and scores decrease when placed on nodes that are furthest away
from nodes containing business critical information and have some form of security in place.
Table 8
Final Results of Random CVE Location Experiment
Run #
1

2

3

4

5

CVE

Location of
CVE

CVSS Base Score

CVSS Modified Score

CVE-2019-10209

2

2.2

8.8

CVE-2019-10129

2

6.5

8.8

CVE-2019-16850

2

9.8

8.8

CVE-2019-10209

11

2.2

0

CVE-2019-10129

11

6.5

0

CVE-2019-16850

11

9.8

0

CVE-2019-10209

7

2.2

0

CVE-2019-10129

7

6.5

0

CVE-2019-16850

7

9.8

0

CVE-2019-10209

6

2.2

0

CVE-2019-10129

6

6.5

0

CVE-2019-16850

6

9.8

0

CVE-2019-10209

10

2.2

5.4

CVE-2019-10129

10

6.5

5.4

CVE-2019-16850

10

9.8

5.4

Note. Table grouped by location to better illustrate how location impacts CVSS modified scores
Experiment 2: Mutation of Network Communications
Experiment 2 places all CVE’s onto a single node and randomizes the communications
graph edges and the complexity and privileges needed to traverse the edge. The
communication graphs are randomly generated for each run but doing so introduces a bias in
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that generated networks are not realistic. However, the purpose of this experiment is to
specifically test the "firewall" permissions of the network and the possibility that firewalls are
misconfigured. The connectivity graph was not changed for any tests. Like Experiment 1, this
experiment was run five times with new mutations for each vulnerability. For this experiment,
Node 10 was chosen to compare how the new scores compared to the calculated scores from
Experiment 1. Calculating different scores from the first experiment will show changes in the
communication configurations do have an impact on modified scores. Figure 22. shows the
affected node in the context of the connectivity graph. As with the first experiment, Experiment 2
was given a seed of 7210646720054949315 to allow for repeatability. An example adjacency list
of the communications graph that was randomly generated for the first run of Experiment 2 is
displayed in Table A2.
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Figure 22
Connectivity Graph of Experiment 1, with highlighted affected node

Note. The highlighted node, Node 10, is the node selected for the all the runs that contains the
vulnerabilities
Results from the first run are shown in Tables 9, 10 and 11. The analysis shows that
despite staying on the same nodes, severities are influenced by various configurations of
communication edges. The calculated modified severity score of all vulnerabilities for the first
run is 9.1. This is an increase from the base severity scores for CVE-2019-10129 (2.2) and
CVE-2019-10209 (6.5), and a decrease for CVE-2019-16850 (9.8). The increase in the base
scores of the first two vulnerabilities is largely attributed to a path of no privileges from the
internet existing as well as a path with low complexity existing.
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Table 9
CVE-2019-10129 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

None

None

Unchanged

High

High

None

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
Table 10
CVE-2019-10129 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

None

None

Unchanged

High

High

None

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
Table 11
CVE-2019-10129 Modified Metrics of Run 1
MAV

MAC

MPR

MUI

MS

MC

MI

MA

Network

Low

None

None

Unchanged

High

High

None

Note. Modified Metrics that have changed compared to their original metric are bolded
The full results of all five runs are summarized in Table 12 below. The adjacency lists for
each run were omitted for brevity. The overall results of the runs show that scores are directly
affected by network communication configurations.
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Table 12
Final Results of Random Communications Experiment
CVE
CVE-2019-10209

CVE-2019-10129

CVE-2019-16850

Run #

CVSS Base Score

CVSS Modified Score

1

2.2

9.1

2

2.2

5.4

3

2.2

6.5

4

2.2

9.1

5

2.2

0

1

6.5

9.1

2

6.5

5.4

3

6.5

6.5

4

6.5

9.1

5

6.5

0

1

9.8

9.1

2

9.8

5.4

3

9.8

6.5

4

9.8

9.1

5

9.8

0

Note. Table grouped by CVE and ordered by run to show impact of different configurations on
the same CVE
Research Question Analysis
This thesis poses two research questions to answer while developing the framework for
integrating context-aware network graphs into CVSS Environmental score calculation.
R1. Can context-aware network graphs capture the required metrics to calculate CVSS
Environmental scores?
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The results from experimentation show that the context-aware network graphs do
capture the required metrics to calculate CVSS Environmental scores. The evaluation shows
that severity scores change greatly depending upon the configuration of the network and the
importance of the data stored on the node. Experiment 1 tests the physical location of a
vulnerability in the network. The expectation of this test is the methodology would increase a
node's severity score the closer to the entry point in the network it resides. During the first run,
the vulnerabilities were assigned to an Internet-facing router. This location is most exposed to
attackers so it would make sense for vulnerabilities to have a calculated modified severity that is
considered high. This run proves exactly that, vulnerabilities had increased their severity scores.
To contrast the scenarios where the modified severity score is expected to increase,
there were two scenarios where the score was expected to decrease. From the same run, the
most severe vulnerability, CVE-2019-16850, had a modified severity score that was calculated
lower than the base score. The original network presented contained a network firewall in
between the router and the internet. Because of this, the expectation was that introducing the
concept of a firewall into the network graphs would decrease the severity scores of
vulnerabilities to some degree. The second expectation was that a vulnerability furthest from the
Internet would have a lower modified severity score. This can be attributed to the fact that
attempting to access a device that can only be reached from other devices can make
exploitation more complex. Using Run 3 of Experiment 1 as an example, it can be seen that the
severity scores of the vulnerabilities on Node 7 were decreased to zero. This is due to the fact
this particular node is physically far away from the Internet relative to other nodes, had little
permissions to communicate to other nodes, and contained very little business data.
All the scenarios where it was expected for the modified severity score to either increase
or decrease based on the context of the network, were satisfied. From the analysis of the results
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of experimentation, context-aware network graphs can capture the required metrics for CVSS
scoring.
The second research question this thesis poses is the following:
R2. Can the proposed technique accurately calculate CVSS Environmental scores?
The results from experimentation confirm that the proposed methodology can accurately
calculate the CVSS Environmental Scores. Looking closely at the modified severity scores, it is
evident that vulnerabilities that exist on the same network location with the same
communications configurations will yield identical scores. This observation supports the idea
that contextual data about the network affects each vulnerability in the same way. Large
variations in the modified severity score between the vulnerabilities with the same network
location and configuration would show that the additional context either did not accurately
capture the impact of security protocols or lack thereof on the severity of the vulnerability.
On the other hand, each vulnerability yielded identical severity scores compared to other
vulnerabilities of the same run. This shows that the proposed methodology needs additional
contextual data to increase the accuracy further. The expectation is that vulnerabilities in the
same environment should still keep their ranking relative to other vulnerabilities. For instance,
Run 1 in Experiment 2 for all vulnerabilities calculated modified severity scores of 9.1. While the
configuration for that run increased the scores of the Low and Medium’ severity vulnerabilities,
the modified severity score for the Low severity vulnerability should have been lower than the
Medium severity vulnerability. This result would show analysts that the Medium’ severity
vulnerability is still more severe in relation to the Low severity vulnerability and should be
prioritized first.
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Limitations
One of the major limitations of this paper is the oversimplification of networks. Computer
networks are extremely complex with various hardware and software components that can
change the security of the overall networking. Overall, the methodology aims to provide a good
estimation of the modified severity of a CVE, however the score could become more accurate if
additional network complexities were implemented.
The device types introduced serve merely for semantic categorization of different
devices for the proposed approach and do not currently impact the scoring process. A network
with only machines will generate the same scoring as a network with carefully defined node
types. Future work can expand the list of device types, and explore how the different types of
devices change the interactions between other devices. An example of an improvement would
be to include a firewall node type and explore how hardware firewalls can be configured to lower
the impact of a vulnerability.
Currently, the methodology analyzes each vulnerability independently of each other.
However, this process ignores the fact that vulnerabilities can impact each other. It’s not unusual
for attackers to exploit stepping stone vulnerabilities to gain additional access to a system
before executing the vulnerability that is under scrutiny, and including this additional information
could help contextualize the vulnerability in question better.
When analyzing a vulnerability's attack complexity, the methodology does not consider
how the length of a path can affect the complexity. For instance, a path of five Low complexity
nodes could be more complex than a path of three High complexity nodes due to the work
needed to compromise a node and traverse to the next. This limitation could result in lower
complexity scores for long paths with Low complexity.
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The questionnaire serves as a tool for adding context to a node to understand a
vulnerability's impact on the information stored on that particular node. While the questionnaire
covers a good spread of topics, the questions could be a bit broad and may miss important
security concepts that can affect the overall scoring of Confidentiality and Integrity impacts.
Along with the broad questionnaire questions, the scoring system for Confidentiality and
Integrity impacts is not granular enough. The questions provided are meant to identify negative
characteristics of a machine, but they miss any positive aspects in the security policies for a
particular machine. For example, the questionnaire asks if a machine contains user information
and answering Yes applies a negative score. However, the questionnaire does not ask if the
user information stored is protected in any way, a question that could lessen the overall impact if
there is.
Future Work
The methodology presented in this paper applies a holistic approach for calculating
updated severity scores and as such provides ample areas for improvement. One aspect of the
approach that could be improved is the use of various node types to refine the updated score.
The approach utilizes node types as a way to provide the analyst semantic meaning but are not
used in any way. The current approach could assign the machine type to every node, and
generate the same score. An improvement could be to provide weights to nodes based on their
type. An example would be to give a server a higherAvailability Impact weight as a down server
could affect users outside the network.
Another improvement would be to expand the security questionnaire capabilities. The
questionnaire asks questions that are meant to add additional context to a machine. However,
these questions are basic and the scoring process could be improved by crafting additional,
more complex questions that are more focused on a particular problem. Another aspect of the
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questionnaire that could be addressed is the scoring system used to determine impacts.
Additional research could be performed to create an in-depth scoring system that applies a
variety of weights to different questions based on the context of the question. For example,
answering yes to a question regarding whether passwords are stored on a machine in plaintext,
should contribute a higher weight to overall impact than answering yes to questions regarding
whether logs are stored on a machine. The questionnaire could also be improved by devising a
scoring system that considers the relationships between the various questions asked and can
adjust the score based on the group of answers. For instance, the answer to a question asking if
the system stores log information can have a greater weight if the system also stores personal
information within the logs. On the flip side, the weight could be diminished if the user indicates
that the system encrypts the log entries that contain personal information.
The methodology outlined in the paper did not consider Scope and User Interaction
metrics due to their complexity and could provide a basis for future work. Scope in particular
could be integrated into the methodology given additional research into how system
configurations can allow or prevent an attacker from changing their Scope.
A further improvement to the scoring of severity, would be to perform analysis with all
CVE’s in mind, instead of each individually. When exploiting vulnerabilities in a network, an
attacker may utilize a variety of CVE’s to achieve their goal and as such, each environmental
score should take into consideration whether an unrelated CVE could upgrade or downgrade
the severity of the analyzed CVE.
The approach currently provides a static analysis of the network. Incorporating attacker
behavior modeling could further refine the updated scores.
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Conclusion
This thesis proposes an approach to improve CVSS Environmental scores by
introducing and integrating the topology of the network. Various algorithms were developed to
measure the various CVSS metrics and combine their results to calculate a modified base
score. A questionnaire was introduced to capture contextual information about the information
stored on the machines under scrutiny. Through various experimentation of random CVE
locations and random permissions, adding contextual network information does impact the
environmental scores. Experiments also show that the proposed technique can accurately
calculate CVSS Environmental scores. However, the generated scores do not take into account
enough context regarding the CVE in scrutiny, so further research is needed to further refine the
approaches accuracy.
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Appendix
Table 1
Adjacency List of Permissions Network Generated for Experiment 1
Node

Neighbor

Complexity Needed

Privilege Needed

2

Low

Low

3

Low

None

5

High

Low

6

High

High

10

High

None

11

High

None

12

High

None

4

Low

None

8

Low

High

9

High

None

10

Low

High

1

Low

Low

4

High

None

8

High

None

1

Low

Low

2

Low

None

3

High

None

5

Low

Low

1

2

3

4

69

6

High

None

7

High

High

9

Low

None

12

High

High

1

Low

None

4

Low

Low

9

Low

High

1

High

Low

4

High

None

4

High

High

10

Low

Low

12

Low

None

2

Low

High

3

High

None

12

High

Low

2

High

None

4

Low

None

5

Low

High

11

Low

High

12

High

High

5

6

7

8

9

10
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1

High

High

2

Low

High

7

Low

Low

12

Low

Low

1

High

None

9

Low

High

12

Low

Low

1

Low

Low

4

High

High

7

Low

None

8

High

Low

9

High

High

10

Low

Low

11

12

Table 2
Adjacency List of Permissions Network Generated for Run 1
Node

Neighbor

Complexity Needed

Privilege Needed

2

Low

None

3

Low

Low

4

Low

High

8

High

None

1

Low

None

1

2
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3

Low

High

8

High

None

10

High

High

12

Low

High

1

Low

Low

2

Low

High

4

High

None

5

High

Low

6

High

Low

7

Low

None

8

Low

None

9

Low

None

10

Low

Low

12

Low

Low

1

Low

High

3

High

None

5

High

Low

6

Low

Low

7

Low

None

8

High

None

9

Low

High

10

High

None

11

Low

High

12

High

None

3

4

72

5
3

High

Low

4

High

Low

7

Low

None

10

Low

High

11

Low

None

12

Low

High

3

High

Low

4

Low

Low

7

High

Low

8

High

Low

9

High

Low

10

Low

High

12

High

None

3

Low

None

4

Low

None

5

Low

None

6

High

Low

8

High

None

9

High

High

1

High

None

2

High

None

3

Low

None

6

7

8

73

4

High

None

6

High

Low

7

High

None

9

Low

None

10

High

High

11

Low

None

3

Low

None

4

Low

High

6

High

Low

7

High

High

8

Low

None

11

High

None

12

High

None

2

High

High

3

Low

Low

4

High

None

5

Low

High

6

Low

High

8

High

High

11

High

High

12

Low

Low

4

Low

High

5

Low

None

9

10

11
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8

Low

None

9

High

None

10

High

High

12

High

Low

2

Low

High

3

Low

Low

4

High

None

5

Low

High

6

High

None

9

High

None

10

Low

Low

11

High

Low

12

